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FOREWORD 0
The Debris Team has developed and implementedmeasures to control damage from debris in the
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows.
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic
analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the
Kennedy Space Center Photo/Video Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall
Space Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the
mission.
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Photo 1 : Launch of Shuttle Mission STS-70 
O 1.0 SUMMARY
A pre-launchdebris inspectionof the padandShuttlevehicle was performedon 12 July 1995. The
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-2 also includedthe primary flight elements OV-
103 Discovery (21st flight), ET-71 (LWT 64), and BI-073 SRB's. There were no vehicle or
facilityanomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded on 13 July 1995. There were no Launch Commit Criteria (LCC),
OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR's were taken. Due to the ambient weather
conditions at this time of year, there were no acreage icing concerns. There were also no
. protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base. The Final Inspection Team
specifically checked the woodpecker damage site repairs, none of which exhibited ice/frost
formations, debonds, or material protrusions. The portable STI scanner showed no unusual or
unexpected temperature gradients between the repaired areas and the adjacent acreage.
After the 09:41:55 a.m. (local) launch on 13 July 1995, a debris walk down of Pad 39B was
performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. There was no visual indication of a
stud hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. All the T-0 urnbilicals operated properly.
Extensive damage occurred to the facilitycable tray covers running along side the hydrogen cross
country fill lines on the northeast side of the pad. Some of the concrete supports were also broken
A total of 125 filmsand videos were analyzedas part of the post mission data review. No vehicle
damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. A large piece
of aft skirt instafoam, approximately 18 inches long by 10 inches wide by 10 inches thick, stuck to
the RI-I SRB aft skirt purge line as the vehicle lifted off holddown post #2. On-orbit crew
handheld still photography showed no anomalieson the ET after separationfrom the Orbiter.
O The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after retrieval. The number of MSA-2
debonds onboth frustums was average. The RH SRB BSM aft attach bracket adjacent to HDP #1
was missing K5NA to substrate.
A post landing inspection of OV-103 was conducted 22 July 1995 on runway 33 at KSC. The
Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 127 hits, of which 9 had a major dimensionof 1-inch or larger.
Based on these numbers and comparison to statistics from previous missions of similar
configuration, the total number of hits was slightlyless than average and the number of hits 1-inch
or larger was significantly less than average. The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 81 hits,
of which 5 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger. These numbers might indicate minimal
problems with ET ice, failed woodpecker damage repairs, and intertank TPS divots during ascent.
. Main landing gear tires and brakes were in good condition for a landing on the KSC concrete
runway. However, four pieces of rubber from the nose landing gear tire were recovered at the
5500 foot marker. The tire was damage by contact with centerline light cover #4-9 protruding
. 1/4-inchabove the adjacent runway concrete. This particular cover, one of 298 on the nmway
centerline, is 3/4-inch steel, 12 inches in diameter, and secured with six 3/8-inch bolts recessed
into U-shaped cutouts. Filler compound, placed between the cover and the runway concrete, has
not been a debris problem. Recent inspections identified nineteen centerline light covers exceeding
a 1/8-inch protrusion (program specification). Several plans to correct the problem prior to the
STS-69 landing are currently being assessed.
Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a variety of residuals in the Orbiter
window samples from the facility environment, SRB BSM exhaust, Orbiter TPS, and
O paints/primers from various sources. These residual samplingdata do not indicatea single sourceof damaging debris as all of the noted materialshave previously been documented in post-landing
sample reports. The residual sample data showed no debris trends when compared to previous
mission data.
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING W
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefingfor launchactivities was conducted
on 12 July 1995 at 0830 hours. The following personnel participated in various team activities,
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in this
document.
J. Tatum NASA - KSC Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
B. Davis NASA - KSC Digital Imaging Systems
R. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, Thermal Protection Systems
B. Bowen NASA - KSC Infrared Scanning Systems
K. Tenbusch NASA - KSC ET Thermal Protection Systems .
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Mechanisms/Structures
M. Bassignani NASA - KSC ET Mechanisms, Structures, Handling
M. Valdivia LMSO - SPC Supervisor, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
R. Seale LMSO - SPC ET Mechanical Systems
J. Blue LMSO - SPC ET Mechanical Systems
W. Richards LMSO - SPC ET Mechanical Systems
M. Wollam LMSO - SPC ET Mechanical Systems
Z. Byrns NASA - KSC Level II Integration
J. McClymonds ILl - Downey Shuttle Aerodynamics
K. Mayer Rockwell LSS Systems Integration
S. Reynolds Rockwell LSS Systems Integration
J. Cook THIO - LSS SRM Processing
S. Otto LMSO - LSS ET Processing
M.-Barber LMSO - SPC Safety
O
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O 3.0 LAUNCH
STS-70 was launched at 95:194:13:41:55.020 GMT (9:41:55 a.m. local) on 13 July 1995.
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 12 July
1995 from 0930 to 1115 hours. The detailed walkdownof Pad 39B and MLP-2 also included the
primary flight elements OV-103 Discovery (21st flight), ET-71 (LWT 64), and BI-073 SRB's.
There were no vehicle anomalies. Loose MLP deck bolts on the pedestals adjacent to HDP #3
and #7, and on an access door in the northeast raised deck area were annotated in OMI S0007,
- Appendix K for resolution prior to cryoload.
3.2 FINAL INSPECTION
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 13July 1995 from 0425 to 0600
during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no Launch Commit
Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR's were taken. Due to the
ambient weather conditions at this time of year, there were no acreage icing concerns. There were
also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were:
T-3 Hours T-0 Launch
Wind Speed (knots): 04 03
O Wind Direction (degrees): 314 044Relative Humidity (percent): 89 82
Temperature (degrees F): 75 82
Dew Point (degrees F): 66
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to scan the
vehicle for unusual temperature gradients, particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed
scanners, and to obtain a random sampling of vehicle surface temperature measurements to
thermally characterize the vehicle. The scan also verified the integrity of 174 woodpecker hole
repairs.
3.2.1 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. The paper covers on all RCS thrusters
. were intact. Typical ice/frost accumulations were present at the SSME #1 and #2 heat shield-to-
nozzle interfaces. No anomalies were observed on the new Block SSME in the #1 position though
liquid oxygen falling from the drain line reached the flame trench floor before completely
vaporizing. An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat shield or
engine mounted heat shields.
3.2.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the fixed STI radiometers ranged from 76 to 78 degrees F.
In comparison, temperatures measured by the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEI)
ranged from 76-82 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum
requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by THIO was
81 degrees F, which was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F.
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3.2.3 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFTCE'was run as a general comparison to
infrared scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost
accumulation on the TPS acreage surfaces after cryoload.
A three-man segment of the Final Inspection Team specificallychecked the woodpecker damage
site repairs, none of which exhibited ice/frost formations, debonds, or material protrusions. The
portable STI scanner showed no unusual or unexpected temperature gradients between the
repaired areas and the adjacent acreage.
The Final Inspection Team observed light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the
LO2 tank. There were no TPS anomalies.
The intertank acreage exhibitedno TPS anomalies.Typical ice/frost accumulation, but no unusual
vapor, was present on the ET umbilical carrier plate.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LH2 tank. Light condensate, but no ice or frost
accumulations, were present on the acreage.
There were no anomalies on the redesigned bipod jack pad closeouts. Two cracks, 4-inches long
by 1/4-inch wide and 5-inches long by 1/8-inchwide, were present in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray
forward surface TPS. The two-crack condition was assessed from a debris and ascent thermal
environment standpoint and was found acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows and support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost fingers on the separation
bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical.
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2
feedline bellows were wet with condensate.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier top and outboard sides. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and
plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost had formed on the aft pyro canister closeout bondline. No unusual
vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and launch.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies,which were all acceptable for launch per
the NSTS-08303 criteria, consisted of three OTV recorded items.
3.2.4 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch (LCC
requirement).
No leaks were observed on either the LO2 or LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals,the GH2 vent line, or
the Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP).
The loose bolt on the film camera E-16 mount near the LH SRB exhaust hole could not be
removed due to the presence of a nut on the inside of.the housing. The bolt, which could not be
torqued, was left wrench tight. The bolt will be welded in place after launch.
OO Photo 2 : Woodpecker Damage to Intertank TPSCavities, as largc as 2 to 3 inchcs in dialnctcr, had bccn pcckcd in ihc ET TPS
by Northcnl Flickcr woodpcckcrs
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iO Photo 4: TPS Repairs on the ExternaI TankMore than 170 woodpecker holes were repaired on thc External Tank
Note yellow balloon with prcdator eyes installed on the facility as a woodpecker dctciTcnt
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O Photo 5 : Two-Crack Condition on -Y ET/SRB Cable Tray
Thc condition was assessed by the Ice/Debris Team and tbund acceptable for flight
9
O Photo 6 LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical
Ice/frost accumulations on thc umbilical wcrc lcss than usual
I0
O Photo 7 : Woodpecker Hole Repairs After CryoloadTypical PDL repairs to the woodpecker holes in the External Tank TPS
None of the repairs exhibited ice/frost fbrmations, dcbonds, or material protrusions
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O 4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS, RSS, and pad acreage was conducted immediately
after launch on 13 July 1995.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found.
The loose bolt on the E-16 camera housing/mount checked by the Final Inspection Team at T-3
hours was still attached to the housing after launch.
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP shoe EPON shim material was intact. There
was no visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. All of the north
. HDP doghouse blast covers were in the closed position. Erosion of the blast covers was minimal.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA), and GOX vent hood appeared
undamaged. The GOX seals stuck momentarilyto the ET nose cone during vent hood retraction
at T-2:30 minutes.
The GH2 vent line had no loose cables (static retract lanyard), and appeared to have latched
properly with no rebound. The vent line was latched on the seventh tooth of the latching
mechanism. The GUCP seal appeared to be in nominal condition. The vent line blankets near the
GUCP had been charred more than usual. A 2-inch by 3/4-inch spring, believed to be from the
facility rather than the GUCP, was found laying in the ground umbilical carder assembly near
electrical connector J2.
O Extensive damage occurred to the facilitycable tray covers running along side the hydrogen crosscountry fill lines on the northeast side of the pad. Some of the concrete supports were also broken
A total of 14 L-shaped metal brackets, 2-inches by 1-inchby 1/8-inch thick, and a metal plate,
6-inches by 1-inchby 1/8-inchthick, were found on the pad surface.
Typical pad damage included:
Broken RSS light shade on the 135 foot level
RSS phone box detached from the wall on the 215 foot level
Broken locker door on the 235 foot level
A 4-foot by 2-foot piece ofmetalized fabric lay in the pad south acreage
. Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 9.
O
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O Photo 8 : Loose Spring on GUCPA 2-inch by 3/4-inch spring, believedto be from the facility rather than the GUCP,
was found laying in the groundumbilical carrier assemblynearelectricalconnectorJ2
13
O Photo 9 : Launch Pad DamageExtensive damage occurred to the facility cable tray covers running along side the hydrogen cross
country fill lines on thc northeast sidc ofthc pad. Somc ofthc concrctc supports wcrc also brokcn
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O 5.0 FILM REVIEW
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team,
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers.No IPR's or IFA's were generated as a result of
the fill review. Post flight anomalies arelisted in Section 9.
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 102 films and videos, which included thirty-nine 16mmfilms, twenty-one 35mm films,
four 70ram films, and thirty-eight videos, were reviewed startingon launch day.
No vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission.
• Both northeast and southwest GOX vent seals stuck momentarily to the External Tank nosecone
topcoat during seal deflation/retraction at T-2:30. No significant amounts off missing topcoat
were noted. Residual GOX vapors vented from the frost-coated ET northeast louver. The
External Tank "twanged" approximately 32 inchesduring SSME ignition (E-79).
SSME ignition and gimbal appeared normal (OTV 151,170, 171). A flare occurred in the SSME
#3 plume during startup (E-2). One flare occurred in the SSME #1 exhaust plume prior to lifloff.
A dark object, most likely a moth, fell from a dark area on the LH OMS pod at 13:41:50.317
GMT (E-77).
SSME ignition caused ice to shake loose from the forward side of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical,
fall onto the cable tray, deflect toward the Orbiter, contact tiles in the vicinity of the umbilical
cavity sill, and rebound away from the Orbiter at 13:42:52.047 GMT. No tile damage was visible
O (OTV 109, OTV 163).
One piece of ice from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical contacted the feedline support bracket and
Orbiter tiles near the disconnect area. No TPS damage was visible.
Dirt or tile "dust" emanated from left inboard and outboard elevon lower surface tiles near the
elevon hinge line during SSME ignition at 13:41:50.077GMT (OTV 109, OTV 064; E-31).
Small pieces of tile surface coating material were lost from two places on the base heat shield
including one place outboard of SSME #3 (OTV 149; E-17, -18, -19, -20).
GUCP disconnect from the ET was nominal (E-33). GH2 vent line retraction and latch were
normal. Pieces of ice shook loose from the GUCP and fell aft without contacting flight hardware
. (E-41, -50, -60).
Ice was shaken loose from the LO2 feedline upper bellows, but no impacts to flight hardware
- were observed (E-65).
A large piece of aft skirt instafoam, approximately 18 inches long by 10 inches wide by 10 inches
thick, stuck to the RH SRB aft skirt purge line as the vehicle lifted offholddown post #2. Loss of
this foam piece was not a safety-of-flightconcern (E-8). The SRB plume most likely fragmented
this foam into numerous smaller pieces in the north flame trench. (The area of missing foam under
the aft skirt was visible in film item E-25).
No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. No ordnance fragments or frangible
O nut pieces fell from any of the DCS/stud holes (E-7 through E-14). Pieces of aluminumtape cameloose from HDP firing lines and fell into the SRB ex aust ole (E-13, -14).
15
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A debris particle moved eastward under the Orbiter right wing at liftoff, but no contact with the
flight hardware was observed (E-l).
Although an expected event, more than usual amounts of SRB throat plug and sound suppression
water trough material exited the SRB exhaust holes at T-0 (E-l, -4, -15, -16).
Two dark-colored objects first appeared above the LO2 TSM but actually originated from an area
behind the RH SRB at 13:41:56.661 GMT. The objects may have been ejected upward out of the
SRB exhaust hole, but did not contact flight hardware in this field of view (E-76).
Two pieces of red SRB sound suppression water trough passed the LO2 TSM shortly after liftoff.
A large chunk of SRB throat plug material was ejected upward out of the SSME flame trench
south of the MLP, but the piece did not contact flight hardware (E-77). b
A debris particle fell from the GOX vent arm area after the vehicle had cleared the tower (E-62).
Several larger-than-usual pieces of LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier baggie material
fell aft past the body flap into the SRB plume at 13:42:11.800 GMT (E-52).
Body flap movement (amplitude and frequency) was similar to previous flights (E-212, -220).
Tape had come loose on SRB aft skirt thermal curtains during ascent (E-207).
Localized flow condensation collars formed on the vehicle during ascent starting at 13:42:38
GMT. This is an expected occurrence given the ambient weather conditions at the time of launch
(TV-2, TV-4, TV-13; film items E-220, -222, -224). /
A blurred white object passing across the External Tank at 13:42:53.521 GMT is believed to be
an insect close to the camera lens (TV-4). A second blurred object crossing the field of view from
right to left and making an abrupt turn near the exhaust plume at 13:44:02 GMT is also believed
to be a bird or insect near the camera lens (TV-21).
Exhaust plume recirculation, ET aft dome charting, and SRB separation appeared normal (E-208,
-220).
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Photo 10 : Aft Skirt lnstafoam Pulled Loose
O A large piece of aft skirt instafoam, approximately !8 inches long by 10 inches wide by 10 inchesthick, stuck to the RH SRB t skirt purge line as the vehicle ifted offholddown post #2. Loss of
this foam piece was not a safety-of-flight concern.
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Photo II : UmbilicalPurge Barrier Material
O Several larger-than-usualpieces of LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrierbaggie material fell aft p st the body flap i to the SRB plume at 13:42:11.800GMT
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Photo 12 : Condensation Collars and Moisture Layers
O Localized flow condensation collars formed on the vehicle due to supersonic shock waves andpassage through atmospheric moisture layers during ascent starting at 13:42:38 GMT. This was
an expected occurrence given the warm, humid ambient weather conditions at the time of launch.
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O 5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
DTO-O312was performed by the flight crew. Thirty-seven hand-held still images were obtained
of ET-71 after separation from the Orbiter. Coverage of the ET +Z side was especially good.
OV-103 was not equipped to carryumbilical cameras.
No vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have been a safety of flight
concern.
ET structural separation from the Orbiter appeared nominal. The LH2 and LO2 tank acreage was
in good condition with no visible divots. The BSM bum scars on the LO2 tank were typical. No
anomalies were observed on the nosecone, PAL ramps, RSS antennae, flight door, GUCP area,
• LO2 feed line, and aft hard point. Exhaust plume recirculation effects on the manhole cover
closeouts and aft dome apex was also typical.Charring and erosion of aft dome TPS was similar
to that observed on previous missions.
Unusual comprehensive photographic coverage of the ET +Z side showed no intertank acreage or
stringer head divots and no intertank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout divots. Light-colored areas on
the -Z side of the intertank were previous repairs and sanded areas, rather than new divots,
documented prior to flight.
Both redesigned bipodjack pad closeouts were intact and appeared to be in good condition.
Nodivots or TPS anomalies were observed at the locations of the woodpecker damage site
repairs.
O Note: The total number of Orbiter lower surface tile damage sites was below average for this
, flight. The number of damage sites with a major dimension of 1-inchor larger was significantly
below average and one of the lowest counts to date when compared to previous flights.
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Photo 13 : ET After Separation from Orbiter
No divots or TPS anomalies were observed at the locations of the woodpecker damage site
repairs. Light-colored areas on the -Z side of the intertank were previous repairs and sandedare s, rather than new divots, documented pri r to flight.
21
Photo 14 : External Tank +Z Side
O Unusual comprehensive photographic coverage of the ET +Z side showed no intcrtank acreage orstringer head divots and no intertank-to-kH2 tank flange closeout divots. Both redesigned bipod
.jack pad closeouts were intact and appeared to be in good condition.
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O 5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 22 fiLmand video items, includingone 16mm film,nine 35mm large format films, and
twelve videos, were reviewed.
Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. There were no anomalies when the
landing gear was extended. Contrails streamed aft of the wing tips. Both main gear touched down
almost simultaneously. There were no unusual control surface deflections. Touchdown of the
nose landing gear was smooth. Although four rubber pieces from the nose gear tires were
recovered on the runway, the event causing the loss of material was not visible in the films.
Drag chute deployment appeared nominal. The Orbiter drifted slightly east of runway centerline
during rollout before correcting back to centei'line.
Rollout and wheel stop were uneventful. No large tile damage sites were visible on the Orbiter
lower surface. Infrared views of landing showed no unusual thermal events.
A large format 35mm camera was positioned in line with the runway threshold line to determine
the altitude of the Orbiter crossing the runway threshold using photographic means. That value
would then be compared at JSC to the Orbiter on-board instrumentation. Measurements on the
film were taken when the left main landing gear tire was centered over the 10 foot wide threshold
line at GMT 12:01:52.209. An altitude of 21.8 feet from the lowest point on the left main gear
tire to the runway surface (left wing was slightly lower than right wind when crossing the
threshold) was calculated. Or, the lowest point on the right main gear tire was 22.9 feet above the
runway surface.
0
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
The BI-073 Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at
CCAFS Hangar AF on 17 July 1995. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in good
condition.
6.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The RH frustum was missing no TPS. The number of debonds (29) over fasteners was average
(Figure 1). Hypalon paint was blistered/missingwhere BTA closeouts had been applied. Some of
the underlying BTA was sooted. The BSM aero heat shieldcovers had locked in the fully opened
position though the left two cover attach rings had been bent by parachute riser entanglement.
The RB forward skirt exhibitedno debonds or missing TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic
base plates were intact. Hypaloripaint was blistered/missingover the areas where BTA eloseouts
had been applied. No pins were missing from the frustum severance ring.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. No K5NA was missing from the separation
plane of the upper strut fairing. The ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers appeared undamaged.by
debris. All three stiffener rings were damaged from water impact. The aft booster stiffener nng
splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
Aft skirt hypalon paint was blistered over areas where BTA closeouts had been applied. A 0.4
inch long by 0.1 inch wide by 0.15 inch deep gouge on the forazard-facing surface of the aft
outboard BSM fairing (closest to the +Z axis) was analyzed by the MSFC materials laboratory, ,_,
which determined the gouge was most likely caused by SRM insulation NBR rubber (reference
PR PV6290235 and USBI Report BLV-050-95MP). The BSM aft attach bracket adjacent to
HDP #1 was missing K5NA to substmte. The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers
were seated and appeared to have functioned properly.
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Photo 15 : RH SRB Frusium
The RH frustum was missing no TPS. The number of debonds (29) over fasteners was average.
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing where BTA closcouts had been applied. The BSM aero heat
shield covers had locked in the fully opened position though the left two cover attach rings had
been bent riser entanglement.by parachute
26
O Photo 16 • RH Forward Skirt
Thc RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Hypalon paint was
blistered/missing over the areas where the BTA closeouts had been applied.
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Photo 17 : R H  Aft BoosterIAft Skirt 
Photo 18 : Gouge on RH Aft BSM Fairing
O A 0.4 inch long by 0.l inch wide by 0.15 inch deep on the forward-facing surface of the aftgouge
outboard BSM fairing (closest to the +Z axis) was most likely caused by SRM insulation NBR
rubber
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O 6.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum was missing no TPS. The number of MSA-2 debonds (28) over fasteners was
average (Figure 2). Hypalon paint was blistered/missingalong the XB-395 ring frame where BTA
closeouts had been applied. Some of the underlying BTA was sooted. The BSM aero heat shield
covers had locked in the fully opened position.
The LH forward skirt exhibitedno debonds or missing TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic
base plates were intact. Hypalon paint was blistered/missingover the areas where BTA closeouts
had been applied. No pins were missing from the frustum severancering.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. No K5NA was missing from the separation
• plane of the upper strut fairing. However, the fairing was deformed as a result of water impact.
The ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers appeared undamaged. All three of the stiffener rings were
cracked from water impact. The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA
material was missing.
Two 5"x2" MSA-2 divots were present over aft skirt fastener heads. The divots appeared to
expose lightly-sooted substmte. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA
closeouts had been applied. The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated
and appeared to have functioned properly with the exception of HDP #7. The plunger had been
obstructed by a frangible nut half most likely as the result of water impact.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
0
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Figure 2 : LH SRB Frustum 
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Photo 19: LHSRBFrustum
The LH frustum was missing no TPS. The numbcr of MSA-2 debonds (28) over fasteners was
O averagc. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing along the XB-395 ring frame where BTA closeoutshad been applied. The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position.
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Photo 21 : LH Aft Boos(er/Afl Skirl
Two 5"x2"" MSA-2 divots were present over aft skirt thstener heads. File divots appeared to
O expose lightly-sooted substrate. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTAcloseouts had been applied. The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated
and appeared to have functioned properly with the exception of tlDP #7. The plunger had been
obstructed by a frangible nut half mos! likely as the result of water impact.
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing debris inspection of OV-103 Discovery was conducted 22-24 July 1995 at the
Kennedy Space Center on SLF runway 33 and in the Orbiter Processing Facility bay #1. This
inspection was performed to identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources. The
Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 127 hits, of which 9 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger.
This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics
from 54 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 25, 26, 26R, 27R,
• 30R, and 42, which had damage from known debris sources), indicates the total number of hits
was slightly less than average and the total number of hits 1-inch or larger was significantlyless
than average (reference Figures 3-6).
The following table breaks down the STS-70 Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 5 81
Upper surface 2 29
Right side 0 4
Left side 0 2
Right OMS Pod 0 4
Left OMS Pod 2 7
TOTALS 9 127
The Orbiter lower surface exhibited a total of 81 tile damage sites, of which 5 had a major
dimension of 1-inchor larger. These numbers might indicate minimalproblems with ET ice, failed
woodpecker damage repairs, and intertank TPS divots during ascent. There were no unusually
large or unique hits though most of the damage sites showed signs of thermal erosion typically
sustained during reentry.
The tile damage sites aft of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical, which are believed to be caused by
impacts from umbilical ice, were typical in number and size.
No tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debrishave been identifiedto date. A deep hole,
1/16-inch in diameter, near the leading edge of the LH MLG door was not considered to be a
micrometeorite hit.
Scorch marks on lower surface tile V070-391035-173 (aft and outboard of the LH NLG door)
showed a piece of tape was present on the tile during flight and most likely fell off during reentry.
Main landing gear tires and brakes were in good condition for a landing on the KSC concrete
runway. However, four pieces of rubber from the nose landing gear tire were recovered at the
5500 foot marker. The tire was damage by contact with centerline light cover #4-9 protruding
1/4-inch above the adjacent runway concrete. This particular cover, one of 298 on the runway
centerline, is 3/4-inch steel, 12 inches in diameter, and secured with six 3/8-inch bolts recessed
into U-shaped cutouts. Filler compound, placed between the cover and the runway concrete, has
not been a debris problem. Recent inspections identified nineteen centerline light covers exceeding
a 1/8-inch protrusion (program specification). Several plans to correct the problem prior to the
STS-69 landing are currently being assessed.
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No ice adhered to the payload bay door. Virtually no white residue was observed around the
waste water dump nozzles. Smalltile damage sites were observed on the leading edge of the LH
OMS pod and at the base of the vertical stabilizer. One shallowdamage site 2.5-inches long by
2-inches wide was located near the mid point of the vertical stabilizer leading edge.
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned nominally. All ET/Orbiter
umbilical separation ordnance retention shutters were closed properly. Less than usual amounts of
umbilical closeout foam and white RTV dam material adhered to the umbilicalplate near the LH2
recirculation line disconnect. Hardware found on the runway included a 1-inch long piece of white
RTV below the LH2 ET door, part of a metallic rivet beneath the EO-2 area, and a portion of a
3/8-inch diameter O-ring under the body flap. The rivet and O-ring have not yet been identified as
flight hardware.
Orbiter windows #3 and #-4exhibitedmoderate hazing and streaking. A light haze was present on
the other windows. The on-orbit impact site on window #6 was not visible from ground level. The
number of damage sites on the window perimeter tiles was observed from a distance (ground
level) and may include some previous repairs which typically shake loose during ascent.
Tile damage on the base heat shield was slightly more than usual. The Dome Mounted Heat
Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were intact and generally in good condition with the exception
of one torn panel at the 3 o'clock position on SSME #2. Tiles on the vertical stabilizer "stinger"
and around the drag chute door were intact and undamaged.
The post landing walkdown of Runway 33 was performed immediately after landing. Flight
hardware found on the runway included three Q-felt plugs near the pilot chute and drag chute
door (4300 foot marker) and rubber from the right nose wheel tire (5500 foot). /
All Orbiter drag chute hardware was recovered and appeared to have functioned normally though
a rip in the riser sheathing was noted near the riser-to-Orbiter attach harness.
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was slightly less than average while the
total number of hits 1-inch or larger was significantly less than average when compared to
previous missions (Figures 7-8).
Orbiter Post Launch Debris Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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Figure 3 : Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Map
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Figure 4 : Orbiter Right Side Debris Map 
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39 
.5 x 2 x .2 5 x lx .4
x.5x.2 0
TOTALHITS=34
HITS> 1 INCH= 3
ALLDIMENSION9
ININCHES
0
Figure6 : OrbiterUpperSurfaceDebrisMap
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LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
STS-6 15 80 36 120
STS-8 3 29 7 56
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58
ST_11 (41-B) 11 19 34 63S- 3 C 5 27 8 36
S T_ 14 (4 l-D) 10 44 30 111
STS-17 (4 l-G) 25 69 36 154
STS- 19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81
STS-27 (51-0 21 96 33 141
STS-28 (51_1) 7 66 17 111
. STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183
STY31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257
ST5_32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193
STS-29 .18 100 23 132
STS-28R 13 60 20 76
STSK._4 17 51 18 53
STS_33R 21 107 21 118
STS_32R 13 111 15 120
• STS_36 17 61 19 81
STS_31R 13 47 14 63
STS_ I 13 64 16 76
STS_38 7 70 8 81
STS_35 15 132 17 147
STS_37 7 91 10 113
STS_39 14 217 16 238
STS_O 23 153 25 197
STS-43 24 122 25 131
STS-48 14 100 25 182
STS-44 6 74 9 101
STS-45 18 122 22 172
STS_49 6 55 11 114
STS-50 28 141 45 184
STS_I6 11 186 22 236
STS-47 3 48 11 108
STS-52 6 152 16 290
S TS-53 11 145 23 240
STS-54 14 80 14 131
STS-56 18 94 36 156
STS-55 10 128 13 143
STS-57 10 75 12 106
STS-51 8 100 18 154
STS-58 23 78 26 155
STS-61 7 59 13 120
STS-60 4 48 15 106
STS-62 7 36 16 97
STS-59 10 47 19 77
STS-65 17 123 21 151
STS-64 18 116 19 150
STS-68 9 59 15 110Q
STS-66 22 111 28 148
STS-63 7 84 14 125
STS-67 11 47 13 76
" STS-71 24 149 25 164
AVERAGE 14.1 90.6 21.1 131.0
SIGMA 7.2 43.2 9.8 54.7
ISTS-70 5 81 9 1271
MISSIONS ST_23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30t:1,AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THISANAL YSIS
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES
Figure 7 : Orbiter Post Flight Debris Damage Summary
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O Figure 8 : Orbiter Debris Damage Comparison Chart
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UnitedStates _,
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Photo 22 : Overall View of Orbiter Right Side
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Photo 23 : Overall View of Orbiter Left Side
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Photo 26 : Debris on Runway
O Hardware found the included l-inch long piece of white RTV below the LH2 ET
on runway a
door, part of a metallic rivet beneath the EO-2 area, and a portion of a 3/8-inch diameter O-ring
under the body flap. The rivet and O-ring have not yet been identified as flight hardware.
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Photo 27 : Base Heat Shield
O Tile the base heat shield than usual. The Dome Mounted Heatdamage slightlyon was moreShield (DMHS) closeout blankets were intact and generally in good condition with the exception
of one torn panel at the 3 o'clock position on SSME #2.
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Photo 28 : Nose Gear Tire Damage
O The nose landing gear tire was damage by contact with centerline light cover #4-9 protruding 1/4-inch above the adjacent runway concrete. Recent inspections identified nineteen centerline light
covers exceeding a l/8-inch protrusion (program specification).
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Photo 29 : Orbiter WindowsOrbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited moderatehazing and streaking.
A light haze was present on the other windows.
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O 8.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of eight samples were obtained from OV-103 Discovery during the STS-70 post landing
debris assessment at Kennedy Space Center. The submitted samples consisted of 8 wipes from
Orbiter windows #1-8. The samples were analyzed by the NASA tLSC Microcbemical Analysis
Branch (MAB) for material composition and comparison to known STS materials. Debris analysis
involves both the placing and the correlating of particles and residues with respect to composition,
thermal (mission) effects, and availability. Debris sample results/analyses are listed by Orbiter
location in the following summaries.
8.1 ORBITER WINDOWS
• Samples from the Orbiter windows indicatedexposure to facilityenvironment, SRB BSM exhaust
(metallic particulate), landing site materials (earth minerals), Orbiter Thermal Protection System
(RTV, tile repair, and glass insulation), Orbiter RCS nozzle cover adhesive, building type
insulation, paints and primer from various sources. There was no apparent vehicledamage related
to these residuals.
8.2 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The results of the STS-70 organic analysis are pending.
8.3 NEW FINDINGS
O This set of post-flight debris residual samples led to no new findings, although the variety ofresidual material continues to be representative of that d cumente i previous mission sampling
(Reference Figure 9).
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O 9.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/videoreview, 5 post launchanomalies,but no In-Flight
Anomalies (IFA's), wereobservedon the STS-70 mission.
9.1 LAUNCH PAD/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY
1. The loose bolt on the E-16 camera housing/mount was still attached to the housing after
launch.
• 2. A 2-inch by 3/4-inch spring, believed to be from the facilityrather than the GUCP, was found
laying in the ground umbilical carder assemblynear electrical connector J2.
9.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
1. A large piece of aft skirt instafoam, approximately 18 inches long by 10 inches wide by 10
inches thick, stuck to the RH SRB aft skirt purge line as the vehicle lifted offholddown post #2.
2. The BSM aft attach bracket adjacent to HDP #1 was missing K5NA to substrate.
9.3 EXTERNAL TANK
1. No items.
0
9.4 ORBITER
1. Main landing gear tires and brakes were in good condition for a landing on the KSC concrete
runway. However, four pieces of rubber from the nose landing gear tire were recovered at the
5500 foot marker. The tire was damage by contact with centerline light cover #4-9 protruding
1/4-inch above the adjacent runway concrete. This particular cover, one of 298 on the runway
centerline, is 3/4-inch steel, 12 inches in diameter, and secured with six 3/8-inch bolts recessed
into U-shaped cutouts. Filler compound, placed between the cover and the runway concrete, has
not been a debris problem. Recent inspectionsidentified nineteen centerline light covers exceeding
a 1/8-inch protrusion. Several plans to correct the problem prior to the STS-69 landing are
currently being assessed.
O
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1. STS-70 (OV-103): Film/Video Screening and Timing Summary
1. STS-70 (OV-103): FILM / VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
O SUMMARY
1.1 SCREENING ACTIVITIES
1.1.1 Launch
Discovery (OV-103) launchedon mission STS-70 frompad B at 13:41:55.027
CoordinatedUniversalTime (UTC) on Thursday,July 13, 1995 (day 194) as seen
on camera E8. Solid rocket booster (SRB) separation occurred at 13:43:57.784
UTC as seen on camera E207.
On launch day, 23 of 24 expected videos were screened, (ET208 was not
received). Following launch day, 53 films were reviewed. No potential
• anomalies were observed duringlaunch.
Detailed Test Objective (DTO-312), photography of the external tank after
separation, was performed using the handheld Nikon camera with a 300 mm lens
and 2x extender. Thirty-seven excellent quality views were acquired. No
external tank anomalies were seen. No unusual markings due to the TPS repairs
were noted. Orbiter umbilical well films were not acquired (OV-103 is not
equipped with umbilical cameras).
1.1.2 On Orbit
Analysis of a micrometoriod debris impact of the Orbiter number "6" (starboard)
O window was done at the request of the MER. An enhanced image of the impactcrater was sent to the MER. No follow-up actionwas requested.
1.1.3 Landing
Discovery landed on runway 33 at KSC on Saturday, July 22, 1995. Twelve
videos of the Orbiter's approach and landing were received.
No major anomalies were noted in any of the approach, landing, and roll-out
video views screened.
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1. STS-70 (OV-103): Film/Video Screening and Timing Summary
Ill I Ill
1.2 TIMING ACTIVITIES
IPLaunch:
Video ET207 had incorrect timing. Film camera E220 did not have timing, and
E222 had incorrect timing. Film cameras: El, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, E8, E9,
El0, Ell, El2, El3, El4, El5, El6, El7, El8, El9, E20, E25, E26, E30, E33,
E34, E35, E36,-E40, E50, E52, E54, E57, E59, E60, E62, E63, E65, E76, E77,
E79, and E224 had in-frame alphanumeric timing. The time codes from videos
and films were used to identify specific events during the initial screening
process. The remaining launch films had coded IRIG time at the edge of the f'dm.
Table 1.2.1 provides the events that were timed.
II III IIIIIIIIII iiiiiiiii IIIIIIII IIII II II I
Event Description Time (UTC) Camera
Launch 194:13:41:55.027' E8 "
Condensation - Start 194:13:42:35.170 KTV21B
Condensation - End 194:13:42:49.885 KTV21B
Recirculation - Start 194:13:43:27.494 ET212
Recirculation - End 194:13:43:39.239 ET212
SRB Separation 194:13:43:57.784 E207
i
A
Table 1.2.1: Launch Film and Video Timing Events
Landing:
Twelve videos were screened on landing day. Eleven videos: KTV5, KTV6,
KTV11, KTV12, KTV13, KTV15, KTV20L, KTV33, SLF South, EL17, and
EL18 had timing. There was no IRIG timing for the SLF North video.
Event Description Time (UTC) Camera
Landing gear - doors opened 203:12:01:39.405 KTV6
Touchdown
Left Main Wheel 203:12:01:59.430 SLF-South
Right Main Wheel 203:12:01:59.530 SLF-South
Nose Wheel 203:12:02:08.519 KTV33
Wheel stop 203:12:02:58.984 KTV15
Table 1.2.2: Landing Video Timing Events 0
I
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2. STS-70 (OV-103): Summary of Significant EventsI 1
O 2. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS2.1 DEBRIS
2.1.1 Debris Near the Time of SSME Ignition
2.1.1.1 LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter Umbilical Disconnect Debris
(Cameras:OTV109,OTV154, OTV161, OTV163, El, E4, E5, E6, E16, E25,
E26, E30, E31, E34, FA0, E41, E52, E62, E65)
Normalice debriswas notedfallingfrom the LH2 andLO2ET/Orbiterumbilical
. disconnectareasat SSME ignitionthrough liftoff. A small light colored piece of
debris appearedto strike the Orbiterumbilical well door sill afterSSME start-up
(T-3.171). No damage to the shuttlelaunch vehicle was seen. No follow-up
" action was requested.
2.1.2 Debris Near the Time of SRB Ignition
2.1.2.1 SRB Flame Duct Debris
(Cameras:El, E3, E7, E8, Eg, El2, El3, El4, El5, El6, E60, E63)
As on previousmissions, debris was notedoriginatingfromthe SRB flame duct
area afterSRB ignition. A single piece of light coloreddebris (probably from the
SRB flame duct)was seen northof the MLP atliftoff. A single light colored
piece of debris was seen movingfrom the exhaust cloudat the northend of the
MLP toward the ShuttleLaunchVehicle at liftoff (0.7 secondsMET). This debris
O was not seen to contact the launch vehicle. Several red coloredpieces of debris(possibly flame duc wa er b ffle material) w re seen near th RSRB h lddown
posts M-3 and M-4 at liftoff (1.1 seconds MET). No follow-up action was
requested.
2.1.2.2 LH2 and LO2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T- 0 Umbilical Disconnect Debris
(Cameras: OTV149, OTV150, El7, El8, EI9, E20, E31, E63, E76, E77)
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical
disconnect areas at liftoff. None of the debris was observed to strike the vehicle.
No follow-up action was requested.
2,1.2.3 GH2 Vent Arm Debris During Disconnect and Retraction
(Cameras: E33, E34, E35, E50, E54, E59, E60)
As on previous missions, vapor and multiple light colored pieces of ice debris fell
from the GH2 vent arm carrier plate at vent arm retraction. The GH2 vent arm
• retraction appeared normal.
2.1.2.4 Upward Moving Debris
(Camera: OTV109)
A small light colored piece of debris traveled up between the body flap and the
SSME bells after SSME ignition (T-5.907). The debriswas not seen to contact
the shuttle launch vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
0
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O 2.1.3 Debris After l.iftoffMultiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle
(SLV) at liftoff, throughout the roll maneuver and beyond, on the launch tracking
views. Most of the debris was probably reaction control system (RCS) paper or
ice from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.3.1 Debris at 1.1 to 2.2 seconds MET
(Cameras: El, E63, E77 )
Figure 2.1.3.1 Debris Seen Near the Orbiter Right Wing Tip
A single dark colored piece of debris was seen near the Orbiter right wing tip
moving in a westerly direction at liftoff. This debris fell aft into the exhaust cloud
and was not seen to contact the launch vehicle (Figure 2.1.3.1). No follow-up
action was requested.
2.1.3.2 Debris at 1.4 seconds MET
9 (Camera: El5)
Several thin, dark pieces of debris were seen by the RSRB holddown post M-4 at
liftoff. The debris was not seen to contact the launch vehicle.
2.1.3.3 Debris at 2.1 seconds MET
(Camera: E65)
A small piece of light colored debris was seen falling along the ET TPS near the
LO2 feedline at liftoff. This debris was not seen to contact the launch vehicle.
O
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O 2.1.3.4 Debris at 2.3 seconds MET(Camera: El)
A dark piece of debris was seen moving toward the SRB flame duct at liftoff.
2.1.3.5 Debris at 2.8 to 3.3 seconds MET
(Cameras: E3, E63, E77)
Two large pieces of dark debris were seen near the LO2 TSM in the exhaust cloud
after liftoff.
, 2.1.3.6 Debris at 4.3 seconds MET
(Camera: OTV161)
• Two light colored pieces of debris fell aft of the launch vehicle after tower clear
(probably RCS paper or umbilical well ice debris).
2.1.3.7 Debris at 16 through 17 seconds MET
(Cameras: E52, E213, E222)
Several light colored pieces of debris (possibly ET/Orbiter umbilical baggy
material) was seen aft of the Shuttle launch vehicle after the roll maneuver
between the left and right SRBs.
2.1.3.8 Debris Reported by the Crew (Task #10)
O The transcript of the crew debris report is as follows:
Capcom: Tom and Kevin if you have a chance, we are ready to copy your
Debris Report if you have one.
Discovery: Standby. Houston Discovery, no debris, especially no feathers.
Just the normal hazing from SRB separation.
Capcom: OK Tom we copy that.
The End.
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2.2 MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORM (MLP) EVENTS
2.2.1 Orange Vapor
(Cameras:OTV170, OTV171)
Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen near the base and above
the rim of SSME #1 just prior to SSME start-up (T-5.2 seconds). Orange vapors
in the vacinity of the SSMEsjust prior to SSME start-up has been seen on
previous mission films and videos. No follow-up action was requested.
2.2.2 Flexing of the Orbiter Base Heat Shield
(Camera: E76)
Flexing of the Orbiter baseheat shield was seen between the SSME cluster at
SSME ignition. Flexing of the base heat shield has been seen on previous
missions. No follow-up action was requested.
2.2.3 Base Heat Shield Erosion
(Cameras: El7, El8, El9, E20)
Slight erosion of the tile surface coating material was seen on the base heat shield
and the bases of the right and left RCS stingers at SSME start-up. Heat shield
erosion has been seen on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
2.2.4 Orange Colored Flash
(Camera: E77)
An orange colored flash was seen in the SSME #1 exhaust plume prior to liftoff at Q
T-0.145 seconds MET. This event has been seen on previous missions. No
follow-up action was requested.
STS-70 JSC Summary Report A11
1. STS-70 (OV-103): Film/Video Screening and Timing Summary
2.2.5 Large Piece of Aft Skirt Instafoam
(Camera: E8!
Figure 2.2.5 (A) Aft Skirt InstaR,am Attached to the RSRB GN2 Purge Line
Figure 2.2.5 (B) Missing lnstafoam on the RSRB Aft Skirt
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O A large piece of aft skirt instafoam remained attached to the RSRB GN2 purgeline near holddown post #2 at liftoff (Figure 2.2.5 A, lower arrow). The missinginstafoam on the RSRB aft skirt could be seen on cameras E5, E8 and E25 (Figure
2.2.5 B and Figure 2.2.5 A, upper arrow). No follow-up action was requested.
2.2.6 RSRB HPU Venting
(Camera: E52)
Venting from the RSRB Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) exhaust port was visible
during liftoff. No follow-up action was requested.
2.3 ASCENT EVENTS
- 2.3.1 Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
Slight body flap motion was observedpriorto liftoff and during ascent.
Photographicanalysisof the body flap motionwas performed. Table 2.3.1 is a
summary of the body flap motionmeasurementsfor STS-70.
I I in ii inn n iii nl mill miNI Illl Illl I
Body Flap Motion Starboard Port side Frequency Camera
(max. measured) side (global)
On Launch Pad 0.5" 0.5" 9.0 Hz E17
O During Ascent - - 9.0 I-Iz E212
Table 2.3.1: Measured Body Flap Motion on the Pad and During Ascent
2.3.1.1 Body Flap Motion on the Pad
(Camera: El7)
Several points defining the aft port and starboard edges of the body flap were
chosen on every fourth frame over a period of 400 frames. This corresponds to
approximately one second of actual data. A control point on the body flap
thickness (assumed to lie in the plane of motion)was used as the scaling factor for
this analysis. The maximum peak-to-peak motion was measured to be
• approximately0.5 inches on the starboard side and 0.5 inches on the port side.
A frequency-domain analysis revealed the existence of several specific modes of
, vibration. Both the port and starboard sides revealed peaks at 9.0 Hz (global
rotation) and the starboard side also revealed peaks at 25.5 Hz (lst bending). This
analysis is part of a long term trend analysis (study) on body flap motion.
O
I I D el I I
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2.3.1.2 Body Flap Motion During Ascent _b,(Camera:E212) W
CameraE212 providedthe best view of body flapmotion seen duringascent. A
subjectivecomparisonbetween this mission and otherssince reflight indicated
slight body flap motion was presenton STS-70. Severalpoints definingthe aft
portand starboardedges of the body flapwere chosen on every other frameovera
period of 200 frames. This correspondedto approximatelythree seconds of actual
data. In addition,two controlpoints on the Orbiterfuselage werechosen to serve
as a controlfor errormeasurements. SSME bell diameters (in the plane of
motion) wereused as scaling factorsfor this analysis. The maximumpeak-to-
peak motion was found to be approximately 0.5 inches on the starboard side and 4,
0.5 inches on the port side. However, most of the measured motion can be
attributed to the presence of the noise in the data.
A frequency-domain analysis identified specific modes of vibration. Both the port
and starboard data revealed peaks at 9.0 Hz (global rotation) and 15Hz (torsion).
However, due to noise dominating many of the higher frequencies, no conclusive
results could be obtained from the analysis. The significance of the presence of
different modes depends upon the results of a long term trend analysis. Camera
defocus problems, atmospheric distortions and measurement errors affected the
overall accuracy of these results.
2.3.2 Vapor from the SRB Stiffener Rings
(Cameras:KTV21B, E2, E5, E34, E40, E62, E222)
More vapors than usual were seen coming from the SRB Stiffener Rings _h,
after liftoff. Vapor from the SRB Stiffener Rings has been seen on w
previous missions and is considered a normal event. No follow-up action
has been requested.
2.3.3 Flares in SSME Exhaust Plume
(Cameras: E212, E223)
An orange colored flare was seen in the SSME exhaust plume after liftoff at
approximately 39 seconds MET (E223). An orange colored flare was also seen in
the SSME exhaust plume at 43.8 seconds MET (E212). Orange colored flares
have been seen in the SSME exhaust plume on previous missions. No follow-up
action was requested.
O
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2.3.4 Condensation
O (Cameras: E207, E212, E220)
O
Figure 2.3.4 Condensation Seen Around Shuttle Launch Vehicle
Condensation was seen around the Shuttle Launch Vehicle between 44 and 57
seconds MET.
2.3.5 Reeirculation (Task #1)
(Cameras: KTV 13, E54, E208, E212)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the Shuttle
Launch Vehicle (SLV) prior to SRB separation has been seen on nearly all8'
previous missions. For STS-70, the start of recirculation was observed at
approximately 92 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately 104
seconds MET. No follow-up action was requested.
O
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2.4 ONBOARD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE EXTERNAL TANK (DTO-312)
O 2.4.1 Analysis of the STS-70 Handheld External Tank Pictures (Task # 5)
DTO-312 photography of the STS-70 external tank (after separation) was
acquired with a Nikon camera with a 300 mm lens and a 2X extender (Method 3).
Thirty-seven views of the external tank from Magazine 303 were received. The
exposure is good on all frames. The focus is good on most frames. Timing data
is present on the film. The first picture was taken on July 13, 1995 at 13:55:19
UTC (approximately 13 minutes after liftoff) and the last picture was taken at
14:03:43 UTC.
+Z Axis -Z Axis +Y Axis -Y Axis
Figure 2.4.1 Handheld Photography of the External Tank
All aspects of the external tank (ET) were imaged (Figure 2.4. l). The external
tank appeared to be in excellent condition. No anomalies were noted. The
normal aeroheating marks and Booster Separation Motor burn scars are visible.
Other marks visible on the external tank TPS were verified by KSC to be the
repairs made prior to launch (woodpecker damage). These repairs appeared to beintact.
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2.5 LANDING EVENTS
O 2.5.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3)
The main gearsink rateof the Orbiterwas determinedover a one second time
periodpriorto main geartouchdown. Also, the nose gearsink ratewas
determinedover a one second timeperiodpriorto the nose geartouchdown.
The measuredmain gearandnose gearsink ratevalues werefoundto be below
the maximumallowable values of 9.6 ft/sec for a 211,000 lb. vehicle and 6.0
ft/sec for a 240,000 lb. vehicle (the landingweight of the STS-70 Orbiterwas
, reported to be 195,800 lbs.). The sink rate measurements for STS-70 are given in
Table 2.5.1. In Figures 2.5.1. and 2.5.2. the trend of themeasured data points for
both film camera image data and video image data are illustrated.
Prior to Touchdown (1 sec) Sink Rate: Film Sink Rate: Video
Main Gear 1.40 ft/sec 1.38 ft/sec
Nose Gear 3.96 ft/sec 4.14 ft/sec
O Table 2.5.1: Sink Rate Measurements
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STS-70 Main Gear Sink Rate e
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Figure 2.5.1 (A): Main Gear Sink Rate from Film (EL9) and Video (Runway South)
(Shown as Trend of Data Points) 8
STS-70 Nose Gear Sink Rate
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Figure 2.5.1 (B): Nose Gear Sink Rate from Film (EL15) and Video (KTV33L)
(Shown as Trend of Data Points)
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O 2.5.2 Orbiter Height above Threshold (Task #13)
The Orbiter height above threshold for STS-70 was measured to be a distance of
23.0 feet between the bottom of the main gear tire and the runway surface as the
Orbiter passed over the runway threshold during final approach. The image
resolution and photogrammetric error considerations indicate an error of +/- 4
inches for this measurement.
2.6 OTHER
. 2.6.1 Normal Events
Other normal events observed include: ice buildup on the SSME vent nozzles,
• normal SSME ignition sequence, RCS paper debrisat SSME ignition, left inboard
and outboard elevon motion at SSME ignition, debris on/near the MLP during
SSME start-up through liftoff, slight vapor from the gaseous oxygen (GOX) vent
on the ET, frost on the ET vent louvers, ET twang, overshoot of the roll
maneuver, slight vertical stabilizer motion at liftoff, contrails from the Orbiter
wing tips after liftoff, acoustic waves at liftoff, bird in the vicinity of the Shuttle
Launch Vehicle at liftoff, RCS paper after liftoff, ET aft dome outgassing after
liftoff, slight body flap motion after the roll maneuver, SRB plume brightening,
andSRB separation.
Normal events seen that are related to the pad are hydrogen ignitor operation,
fixed service structure (FSS) deluge water spray activation, GH2 vent arm
O retraction, hydrogen bum ignitor operation, sound suppression water initiation,mobile launch platform (MLP) water dump activation, and LH2 TSM door
closure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-70, the twenty-
first flight of the Orbiter Discoveryoccurred on July 13, 1995,
at approximately9:42 A.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch
Complex 39B (LC-39B),Kennedy Space Center (KSC),Florida.
Extensive photographicand video coverage exists and has
. been evaluated to determineproper operationof _he ground and
flighthardware. Cameras (videoand cine) providing this
coverage are located on the fixed service structure (FSS),
• mobile launch platform (MLP),LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard
the vehicle, and uprange and downrangetracking sites.
II. ENGINEERINGANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
The planned engineeringphotographicand video analysis
objectivesfor STS-70 included,but were not limited to the
following:
a. Overall facility and shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
b. Determinationof SRB PIC firingtime and SRB
O separationtimec. Verificationof Thermal ProtectionSystem (TPS)integrity
d. Correct operationof the following:
i. SSME ignition
2. SRB debris containmentsystem
3. LH2 and LO2 17" disconnects
4. Ground umbilical carrier plate (GUCP)
5. Free hydrogen ignitors
6. Booster separationmotors (BSM)
7. _ehicle clearances
8. Vehicle motion
e. Verificationof cameras, lightingand timing systems
III. CAMERA COVERAGEASSESSMENT:i
Film was received from fifty-oneof fifty-onerequested
• cameras as well as video from twenty-fourof twenty-four
requested cameras. The followingtable illustratesthe camera
data received at MSFC for STS-70.
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Camera data received at MSFC
for STS-70
16mm 35mm Video
MLP 22 0 4
FSS 7 0 3
Perimeter 3 3 6
Tracking 0 15 10
It
Onboard 0 1 0
Totals 32 19 23
Totfl number of films and _deos received: 74
{i!!i!}iii!ii!i}iiiiii!iiii_ia_i!gbl__oq:ilhe.Engi_edngilPh_t_ph!_i_!_!_ii_iiiiiiii!!!
i_i[_i_@_i_!i_i!iiii!_i!_i_!_i_i_i_i!i_iiiii_i_ii!}iii_i}iiii!iiiii_iiii_n:thei_W_HdiWideilWeb!il _el i_dm !_!iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiillt
i;iii!ii}i;ii!ili!iii!!i;iiill!iiii!i!i_i!!_!!_!_!ii_!_i!_!hffp!X_.m_!!_a_!_/_s_:fi_|_i!i_}}!!!_i!_!i!iiiii} ii!ji;;ill.;;}:i;;}i!i;.i!! !.!.!]
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
All ground cameras operated properly with the exception of
a few minor problems. Camera E-222 does not have valid timing
and camera E-212 experienced mechanical difficulty resutling in g
a short film run. Camera E-213 experienced a tracking problem.
Some tracking items were obscured by clouds.
b. Onboard Camera Coverage:
Thirty-seven frames of the external tank were imaged by the
astronauts using the hand-held camera. All sides of the tank
were imaged. The photographs were of excellant quality.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
No anomalies or issues were detected. However, several of
the typical events noted on most missions were observed. These
include ice/frost from the 17" disconnects at SSME ignition and
liftoff, pad debris, loose thermal curatin tape and small debris
particles such as butcher paper and purge barrier material
falling aft of the vehicle during ascent. No TPS divots on the
external tank were noted after separation from the on-board
hand-held camera film.
White vapors were observed venting from the ET intertank aero
vent (+Z) during SSME start and liftoff. Five pulses of vapors
were observed during this time. Figure one is a film frame from
camera E-34 showing one of the pulses. This type of venting was
last observed on STS-51.
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Figure 1 White vapors from ET aero vent
A large piece of instafoam remained attached to the right SRB
aft skirt purge line at liftoff. Figure two shows this piece and
the resulting divot at the base of the aft skirt instafoam. This
piece was subsequently broken into several small pieces by the
e plume.
Qo
Figure 2 Instafoam on purge line and resulting divot
Two pieces of water baggie material were observed rising from
the SRB flame bucket and striking the LO2 TSM and falling back
e nto the flame bucket at liftoff. Figure three shows this eventas recorded by camera E-34.
B6
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Figure 3 Water baggie material
Two small pieces of debris were observed between the Orbiter
belly and the ET during liftoff from camera E-34. Neither piece
of debris appears to strike the vehicle. These particles are
O typically frost from the LO2 feed-line forward bellows.
A debris induced streak in the SSME plume was observed on film
from camera E-222 during ascent and is shown in Figure four. No
time information is available.
O Figure 4 Debris induced streak in SSME plume
87
A pronounced condensation collar was visible around the vehicle
O during ascent between 44 and 57 seconds MET. Figure five showsthis event from cam ra E-222. This type of event is attributed
to unique atmospheric conditions.
Figure 5 Condensation collar around vehicle
O V. ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times are determined from cameras that view the SRB
holddown posts numbers M-l, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
HOLDDOWN POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I E-9 194:13:41:55.030
M-2 E-8 194:13:41:55.029
M-5 E-12 194:13:41:55.029
M-6 E-13 194:13:41:55.030
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was measured at
31.5 inches. Figure six is a data plot showing the measured
motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and vertical
directions. A positive horizontal displacement represents
motion in the -Z direction. These data were derived from film
camera E-79.
O El-TipDeflectionSTS-70 CameraE-79
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
q, 0.0
-10"06.0 -5.0 -4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -I.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 /_.:L_
Secondsrelative to T-Zero
Figure 6 ET tip deflection
c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-70 was determined to be
O 194:13:43:57.79 UTC as recorded by tracking camera E-207o
O
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